February 10
It is well known that a countable model of PA has a truth predicate if and only if it is recursively saturated. It is also well known that not all countable recursively saturated models of PA have *inductive* or even $\Delta_0$-inductive truth predicates: indeed, such models must satisfy Con(PA), for example. Recent work by Enayat-Pakhomov and Cieśliński-Łełyk-Wcisło explored the principle of 'disjunctive correctness', asserting that every disjunction is true if and only if it has a true disjunct. In particular, one can show that every countable model of PA has a 'disjunctively trivial' elementary extension: that is, an elementary extension with a truth predicate in which all nonstandard length disjunctions are evaluated as true. In this talk, we will see that such 'disjunctively trivial' models are necessarily arithmetically saturated; indeed, we will see that a countable model of PA is arithmetically saturated if and only if it has a disjunctively trivial truth predicate. We will explore related pathologies in truth predicates, and classify the sets which can be defined using such pathologies. We find other surprising connections between arithmetic saturation and these questions of definability. This is joint work with Mateusz Łełyk, based heavily on unpublished work by Jim Schmerl.