CUNY Graduate Center
Hybrid
Organized by Russell Miller
Spring 2022
May 6
2:00pm NY time
Hybrid (email Victoria Gitman for meeting id)
GC Room 6495
Alexei Miasnikov
Stevens Institute of Technology
Rich algebraic structures and weak second order logic
Abstract
“What can one describe by first-order formulas in a given algebraic structure A?” - is an old and interesting question. Of course, this depends on the structure A. For example, in a free group only cyclic subgroups (and the group itself) are definable in the first-order logic, but in a free monoid of finite rank any finitely generated submonoid is definable. An algebraic structure A is called rich if the first-order logic in A is equivalent to the weak second order logic. Surprisingly, there are a lot of interesting groups, rings, semigroups, etc., which are rich. I will discuss some of them and then describe various algebraic, geometric, and algorithmic properties that are first-order definable in rich structures and apply these to some open problems. Weak second order logic can be introduced into algebraic structures in different ways: via HF-logic, or list superstructures over A, or computably enumerable infinite disjunctions and conjunctions, or via finite binary predicates, etc. I will describe a particular form of this logic which is especially convenient to use in algebra and show how to effectively translate such weak second order formulas into the equivalent first-order ones in the case of a rich structure A.
Video
April 22
2:00pm NY time
Hybrid (email Victoria Gitman for meeting id)
GC Room 5417
Jouko Väänänen
University of Helsinki
Stationary logic and set theory
Abstract
Stationary logic was introduced in the 1970’s. It allows the quantifier 'for almost all countable subsets s…'. Although it is undoubtedly a kind of second order logic, it is completely axiomatizable, countably compact and satisfies a kind of Downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem. In this talk I give first a general introduction to the extension of first order logic by this 'almost all'-quantifier. As 'almost all' is interpreted as 'for a club of', the theory of this logic is entangled with properties of stationary sets. I will give some examples of this. The main reason to focus on this logic in my talk is to use it to build an inner model of set theory. I will give a general introduction to this inner model, called C(aa), or the aa-model, and sketch a proof of CH in the model. My work on the aa-model is joint work with Juliette Kennedy and Menachem Magidor.
March 11
The seminar will take place at the CUNY Graduate Center at 2pm in Room C201.
Joel David Hamkins
Notre Dame University
Infinite wordle and the mastermind numbers
Abstract
I shall introduce and consider the natural infinitary variations of Wordle, Absurdle, and Mastermind. Infinite Wordle extends the familiar finite game to infinite words and transfinite play—the code-breaker aims to discover a hidden codeword selected from a dictionary $\Delta\subseteq\Sigma^\omega$ of infinite words over a countable alphabet $\Sigma$ by making a sequence of successive guesswords, receiving feedback after each guess concerning its accuracy. For any dictionary using the usual 26-letter alphabet, for example, the code-breaker can win in at most 26 guesses, and more generally in $n$ guesses for alphabets of finite size $n$. Meanwhile, for some dictionaries on an infinite alphabet, infinite play is required, but the code-breaker can always win by stage $\omega$ on a countable alphabet, for any fixed dictionary. Infinite Mastermind, in contrast, is a subtler game than Wordle because only the number and not the position of correct bits is given. When duplication of colors is allowed, nevertheless, then the code-breaker can still always win by stage $\omega$, but in the no-duplication variation, no countable number of guesses (even transfinite) is sufficient for the code-breaker to win. I therefore introduce the mastermind number, denoted $\frak{mm}$, to be the size of the smallest winning no-duplication Mastermind guessing set, a new cardinal characteristic of the continuum, which I prove is bounded below by the additivity number $\text{add}(\mathcal{M})$ of the meager ideal and bounded above by the covering number $\text{cov}(\mathcal{M})$. In particular, the precise value of the mastermind number is independent of ZFC and can consistently be strictly between $\aleph_1$ and the continuum $2^{\aleph_0}$. In simplified Mastermind, where the feedback given at each stage includes only the numbers of correct and incorrect bits (omitting information about rearrangements), then the corresponding simplified mastermind number is exactly the eventually different number $\frak{d}(\neq^*)$. http://jdh.hamkins.org/infinite-wordle-and-the-mastermind-numbers-cuny-logic-workshop-march-2022/